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Abstract—This paper elaborates about the potential risk of 
systemic instabilities in future networks and proposes a 
methodology to mitigate it. The starting concept is modeling the 
network as a complex environment (e.g. ecosystem) of resources 
and associated functional controllers in a continuous and dynamic 
game of cooperation – competition.  Methodology foresees 
defining and associating utility functions to these controllers and 
elaborating a global utility function (as a function of the 
controllers’ utility functions) for the overall network. It is 
conjectured that the optimization of the global utility function 
ensures network stability and security evaluations. Paper 
concludes arguing that self-governance (with limited human 
intervention) is possible provided that proper local, global control 
rules are coded into these utility functions optimization processes. 
 
Index Terms—Stability, Network of Networks, Cloud 
Computing, Self-Governance 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ECHNOLOGY trends and socio-economic drivers are 
steering the evolution of networks towards a connectivity 
fabric capable of interconnecting huge numbers of 
interacting heterogeneous nodes. One can easily imagine a 
scenario, in the near future, where virtual links are dynamically 
created and destroyed by applications and services to 
interconnect a very dense environment of processing and 
storage resources, sensors, actuators, machines, etc.  
This scenario will be the socio-economic arena of multiple 
Players (e.g. Network and Service Providers, OTT, 
Enterprises, etc.) interacting with each other as in natural 
ecosystem, for providing any sort of services and data. 
 In other words, multiple Clouds (figure 1) interconnected 
through network of networks will create soon a sort of 
complex system of interconnected nodes, devices, machines. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Multiple clouds across multiple networks 
 
 
 
Control and management of this complex environment of 
resources and services will require, unavoidably, the local-vs-
global interaction of multiple controlling systems and methods 
embedding a certain level of automaticity (in order to ease 
human operators and mitigate mistakes). 
As known from the theory, a complex system is a system 
consisting of many diverse and autonomous, but interrelated 
components. Complex systems cannot be easily described by 
rules and their characteristics are not reducible to one level of 
description. In fact, complex systems exhibit properties (e.g. 
self-organization) that emerge from the interaction of their 
parts and which cannot be predicted from the properties of the 
single parts. 
This means that the increasing level of complexity in future 
networks will  bring new unexpected management challenges 
and systemic risks. In particular, it is argued that the level of 
complexity will be soon comparable with the one experienced 
today in the financial trading market (whose dynamics come 
from the intertwining of humans operations and automated 
trading systems). 
In order to make an example, in [1] the banking ecosystem 
is analyzed taking the metaphor of a natural ecosystem as an 
assembly of species: each of which has feedback mechanisms 
that would ensure the population‘s stability only if alone; but  
the assembly, as a whole, may show sharps transition from 
overall stability to instability as the number and strength of 
interactions among species increase. This is very similar to 
what happens in a financial trading market, coming from the 
interactions of several Players with automatic trading 
machineries. In this direction also [2] elaborates about the 
abrupt system-wide transitions and crashes which may occur 
out of spontaneous mix of human and fast control machine 
interactions. 
 An example is the ‗flash crash‘ of May 6th 2010, the second 
largest point swing in the history of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average. For a few minutes, $1 trillion in market value 
vanished. It has been argued that the ‗flash crash‘ was similar 
to a complex system transition due to the unexpected coupling 
of diverse automated trading systems. 
Coming back to networks, it is widely recognized that they 
are strategic assets: in this sense, it is of paramount importance 
to mitigate the risk of these stability transitions, whose primary 
effects might be jeopardizing the performance or, in the worst 
case, creating even a meltdown of a portion of the network. 
This paper proposes modeling the network as a complex 
ensemble (e.g. ecosystem) of resources and functional 
controllers (solving problems) in a continuous and dynamic 
game of cooperation – competition. Utility functions are 
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 associated to these controllers and a global utility function (in 
turn a function of the controllers‘ utility functions) to the 
network. It is conjectured that the optimization of the network 
utility function ensures network stability. Paper then concludes 
arguing that self-governance (with limited human intervention) 
is possible provided that proper local-vs-global control rules 
are coded into the utility functions optimization processes. 
II. EXAMPLE OF TODAY NETWORKS INSTABILITIES 
Risk of instabilities are already present in today network and 
cloud infrastructures. This section will make a brief overview, 
by producing some examples and a selection of the prior art. 
A. Examples and Prior-Art 
In a generic communication network, instability of an end-
to-end path is a cross-layer issue: in fact, it might depend on 
the unwanted combination of diverse control mechanisms 
acting either on the underlying transport network or in the 
higher layers components (e.g. flow admission control, TCP 
congestion control and dynamic routing). 
For example main arguments for introducing and enhancing 
flow admission control are essentially derived from the 
observation that the network otherwise behaves in an 
inefficient and potentially unstable manner. In fact, even with 
resources over provisioning, a network without an efficient 
flow admission control has instability regions that can even 
lead to congestion collapse in certain configurations. 
Another example is congestion control. Currently available 
mechanisms (like TCP Reno and Vegas) are examples of large 
distributed control loops designed for ensuring stable 
congestion control of resources. On the other hand, these 
mechanisms will be ill-suited, from a stability viewpoint, for 
future dynamic network, where transients and capacity will be 
potentially larger [3]. 
A further example is the instability risk in any dynamically 
adaptive routing system. Routing instability, which can be 
(informally) defined as the quick change of network 
reachability and topology information, has a number of 
possible origins, including problems with connections, router 
failures, high levels of congestion, software configuration 
errors, transient physical and data link problems, and software 
bugs. 
In [4] a simple model of a traditional network traffic 
dynamics has been presented showing that a phase transition 
point appears separating the low-traffic phase (with no 
congestion) from the congestion phase, as the packet creation 
rate increases. In [5], the previous model has been improved 
by relaxing the network topology using a random location of 
routers. This enhanced model has exhibited nontrivial scaling 
properties close to the critical point, which reproduce some of 
the observed real Internet features. [6] has discussed a 
possibility of phase transitions and meta-stability in various 
types of complex communication networks as well as 
implication of these phenomena for network performance 
evaluation and control. Specific cases include connection-
oriented networks with dynamic routing, TCP/IP networks 
under random flow arrivals/departures, and multiservice 
wireless cellular networks. In [7] the dynamics of traffic over 
scale-free networks has been investigated. A series of routing 
of data packets have been proposed, including the local 
routing strategy, the next-nearest-neighbor routing strategy, 
and the mixed routing strategy based on local static and 
dynamic information. Results have indicated the existence of 
the bi-stable state in the traffic dynamics: specifically the 
capacity of the network has been quantified by the phase 
transition from free flow state to congestion state. 
 [8] has addressed the risk of instabilities in Cloud 
Computing infrastructures. Paper points out analogies of 
Cloud Computing infrastructures and complex systems 
elaborating about the emergence of instabilities due to the 
unwanted coupling of several reactive controllers.  
III. A METHODOLOGY FOR TAMING INSTABILITIES 
This section proposes an example of methodology to 
mitigate the risk of instabilities in future networks 
infrastructures. 
The approach starts by modeling the network as a complex 
ensemble (e.g. ecosystem) of resources and functional 
controllers in cooperation – competition. It is conjectured that 
the maximization of the network utility function 
(corresponding to an higher level network controller) ensures 
network stability. From an implementation viewpoint these 
controllers can be seen as s/w components (performing 
distributed computations) pluggable in a lightweight 
middleware running on top of network equipment [9]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Example of implementation: a lightweight middleware on top of 
(current) equipment 
 
This middleware substrate should be as minimal as possible 
to achieve great scalability, flexibility and evolution without 
undermining the overall stability e.g. it should offer basic 
services which are needed for supporting: primitive lifecycle 
of the network controllers; means of interactions; sets of 
―fundamental interaction rules‖ (e.g. pub-sub, reaction-
diffusion, excitatory-inhibitory, etc). 
While this basic substrate, and its rules, will not have to 
change (i.e., it will not require re-engineering), the forms 
under which it manifests itself, as a management framework, 
can continuously evolve. 
 In the direction of developing said functional controllers, 
let‘s consider the approach reported in [10]. TCP/IP protocol 
can be seen as an example of optimizer: objective is to 
maximize the sum of source utilities (as functions of rates) 
with constraints on resources (figure 3).  In fact, each variant 
of congestion control protocol can be seen as a distributed 
algorithm maximizing a particular utility function. The exact 
shape of the utility function can be reverse engineered from the 
given protocol. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  TCP Utility Function [10] 
 
Similarly, other recent results also show how to reverse 
engineer Border Gateway Protocols (BGP) as a solution to the 
Stable Path Problem, and contention-based Medium Access 
Control (MAC) protocols as a game-theoretic selfish utility 
maximization [11]. 
Let‘s assume to exploit in a network a number of said 
controllers (i.e. proactive, reactive feedback control loops, 
methods, etc.) performing network features, or solving certain 
problems. The problem we wish to highlight is that instability 
can occur from unintended coupling of independently 
developed controllers (like in a complex system). 
It is conjectured that the problem of ensuring stable network 
performance can be translated into the optimization problem of 
an appropriate global utility function(s) for the overall network 
(or portions of it): this is a functional, i.e. a function of the 
utility functions associated to the single controllers deployed 
in the network. 
As well known, a utility can be seen a value that represents 
the desirability of a particular state or set of configurations of 
the associated system. This is like to say that an utility function 
can be seen as a function mapping consequences of certain 
governance decisions into utility values: so maximizing an 
utility function, U(·), means finding that configuration, Yi , for 
which we get the maximum utility value: ui = U(Yi). 
Therefore proposed methodology is based on a three steps 
approach: 
 Decomposing Network problems: this is an analysis 
required to develop and exploit in network the 
required set of controllers (e.g. Congestion control, 
Dynamic routing, Scheduling, Load balancing, 
Resource Optimization, etc); 
 Deriving Controllers‘ Utility functions: to derive utility 
functions to be associated to above controllers; each 
controller is seen as an optimizer whose objective is 
to maximize its utility, with the related constraints 
[10];    
 Deriving the Network Utility function: to derive the 
utility functional to be associated to the network, 
which is an appropriate function of the Controllers‘ 
Utility functions. 
The task is developing an optimization procedure for 
maximizing the network utility function, or better to find those 
network utility values (corresponding to proper configuration 
of the controllers) so to reach an overall network utility value 
above a threshold. This is like to say to achieve a stable trade-
off for network performance: figure 4 shows a very simple 
example. Let‘s consider two controllers: one in charge of 
optimizing the throughput of the network and another one 
taking care of cost optimization. On one side the higher is the 
number of resources allocated, the higher is the throughput of 
the network, so the utility function of the controller is T=T(n). 
On the other hand, the cost C=C(n) of the network is a 
function monotonically increasing with the number of 
resources allocated. In this very simple example, the overall 
can be written as U(n) = T(n) – C(n). 
The final task is keeping U(n) above a certain threshold 
(fixed, for example by the SLA). 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Example: to achieve a stable trade-off for network performance 
 
It should be noted that this approach has analogies to what 
happens in natural ecosystems. Consider for example a termite 
nest: each termite can be seen as a controller, performing 
certain tasks in the colony. The equilibrium of the ecosystem 
emerge out of self-governance: single termites contribute, 
whist optimizing their utility, to optimize the utility of the nest.  
A. Blocks Diagrams descriptions 
Imagine a network with M controllers: each controller has a 
utility function Ui (·),  concerning certain performance metrics 
(figure 5). 
 
 
Fig. 5.  A network with a set of controllers. 
 
 The global utility function of the network is a function F of 
the utility functions of each controller 
 
Ug (·) = F ( U1 (·),…, UM (·) )         (1) 
 
This is equivalent to say that the network has a global 
controller (whose utility function is Ug (·) ): this is a sort of 
orchestrator, which is in charge of configuring the M 
controllers so to optimize the global utility function. 
Maximizing a weighted sum of all utility values is one 
possible formulation. An approaches may consider multi-
objective optimization to characterize the Pareto-optimal 
tradeoff between the controllers‘ objectives or game-theory. 
 
Figure 6 and 7 show, respectively, the blocks diagrams of  a 
controller and a network controller. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Block diagram of a Controller 
 
The controller has three main blocks: a monitoring function, 
a performance model and a utility function evaluator. In 
particular, the performance model allow adopting  specific 
performance metrics (e.g. throughput as a function of load, 
traffic and number of resources allocated to a network). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Block diagram of a Network Controller 
 
In figure 7 the combinatorial search block looks over the 
space of possible configurations of the parameters of the 
controllers. This could be done at regular time, upon trigger or 
to react to changes in the global utility function.  
For each set of configurations, then the controllers return the 
values of their utility functions Ui, which are used to compute 
the network utility function. When the network controller finds 
a better configuration vector, it re-starts the configuration 
process of controllers. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This increasing level of complexity in future networks will  
bring new unexpected management challenges and systemic 
risks. In particular, it is argue that such level of complexity 
will be soon comparable with the one experienced today in the 
financial market (whose dynamics come from the intertwining 
of humans operations and automated trading systems). There 
will be concrete possibilities of having sharps transition from 
overall stability to instability as the complexity increases. 
As networks are strategic assets, it is of paramount 
importance to mitigate the risk of these stability transitions, 
whose primary effects might be not only jeopardizing the 
performance, but even creating even a meltdown of a portion 
of the network. 
In order to start dealing with this problem, paper has 
proposed a methodology for taming instabilities in complex 
networks. The starting concept is modeling the network as a 
complex ensemble (e.g. ecosystem) of resources and 
functional controllers (solving problems). Utility functions are 
associated to these controllers and a global utility function 
(elaborated as a function of the controllers‘ utility functions) is 
associated to the network. Paper conjectured that the 
optimization of the network utility function ensure stability in 
the network performance. 
The conclusion is that networks‘ stability self-governance is 
possible provided that we are able of coding and tuning (e.g. in 
utility functions and functionals) those rules which are 
governing the delicate interplay of the ensemble of systems 
composing networks.   
Next steps are already concerning the development of a 
concrete use case to test and demonstrate the feasibility of the 
proposed methodology. Theoretically the methodology will be 
also completed by some theorems, still under study. 
Moreover this approach (based on optimizing an 
aggregation function combining single-utility functions from 
the system components) will be applied for the evaluation of 
security systems. In fact, the general expression of these 
functionals allows for an interaction or synergy between the all 
the components under consideration, and this is just what is 
needed in security evaluations.  
In general, advances in this direction may have far reaching 
implications and impacts from a socio-economic viewpoint: in 
this direction, it is of particular interest and relevance to learn 
the lessons from [12]. 
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